Abstract This paper develops a method that incorporates the public value for environmental cobenefits when a conservation buyer can purchase water quality credits based on nonmarket valuation results. We demonstrate this approach through an experiment with adult students in a classroom laboratory environment. Our application contributes to the study of individual preference and willingness to pay for cobenefits associated with the production of water quality credits in relation to the Ohio River Basin Trading Project. We use three different methods to elicit individuals' willingness to pay (WTP), including (1) a hypothetical referendum, (2) a real referendum lacking incentive compatibility, and (3) a real choice with incentive compatibility. Methodologically, our WTP estimates suggest individuals are more sensitive to the cost changes and reveal the lowest value in the real choice with incentive compatibility. Practically, we find individuals value certain cobenefits and credits as public goods. Incorporating public value toward cobenefits may improve the overall efficiency of a water quality trading market. Based on our specification of a planner's welfare function, results suggest a substantial welfare improvement after identifying an optimal allocation of a buyer's budget across credits derived from agricultural management practices producing different portfolios of cobenefits.
Introduction
Water quality trading (WQT) markets are generally based on regulatory authority (e.g., under the U.S. Clean Water Act [National Network on Water Quality Trading, 2015]) leveraging the cap and trade approach to focus the power of market trading on facilitating compliance with, and reducing society's cost for, an established ambient standard [David et al., 1980] . The WQT approach focuses attention and profitable actions on water quality, the production of which may affect other dimensions of environmental quality that markets may not yet value [Lentz et al., 2014] . This paper provides evidence of the potential value that other effects-ancillary or cobenefits-may deliver, and illustrates an initial approach for incorporating these values in WQT markets or transactions.
Since the early 1990s, various water quality trading programs have been tested and implemented across the U.S. Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead [2013] [cf. Shortle, 2013] identified 21 current active and pilot water quality programs that include trading problems with multiple recipients and multiple resources (e.g., Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Trading, Chesapeake Bay Watershed Nutrient Credit Exchange) and offset programs that involve one recipient of water quality credits from one or more sources (e.g., Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot). Through market transactions, high-cost regulated polluters can pay for services from other polluters who face lower costs of abatement. The high-cost polluters buy services by purchasing credits from the lower-cost abatement providers, potentially including nonregulated entities like some agriculture producers [Horan et al., 2004; Ribaudo, 2008; Ribaudo et al., 2008] . Tradable credits arise when an abatement provider reduces its own output of the pollution below its own regulatory requirement. This regulatory-based institution creates opportunities for new agricultural revenue, particularly, in the present study, among farmers who can contribute to water quality improvement through adopting best management practices (BMP).
Similarly, the market focus on water quality can drive providers to overlook opportunities to enhance other environmental benefits or ecosystem services since most of the additional environmental benefits may exist outside such regulatory markets, potentially even leading to additional degradation of some of these stillexternal dimensions of benefits or services. For example, a farmer could implement a riparian buffer strip of grassland or native vegetation, which may not only remove nutrients from runoff water, but also provide cobenefits such as habitat for wildlife or pollinators while sequestering carbon in below-ground biomass. Environmental benefits arising from complex ecosystems or agro-ecosystems generate a variety of tangible and intangible services with each service affecting segments of human society differently. Understanding and integrating the societal valuation of simultaneously produced joint-products could be critical to establishing efficient and effective environmental markets, by leveraging these cobenefits to enhance incentives for environmental improvement, by attracting more providers that can create thicker markets, or by understanding lost opportunities from leaving such benefits as missing elements affected by environmental markets.
In this paper, we assess a practical approach that a conservation buyer could use to value and to integrate public preferences for cobenefits in WQT based on a structural analysis of individual decisions utilizing several variations of the choice-experiment approach to nonmarket valuation, including decisions involving the prospect of actual monetary costs to individuals. The approach defines water quality credits as different types, based not only on whether the credit concerns a nitrogen (N) or phosphorus (P) reduction, but also based on the types of cobenefits generated through the agricultural BMPs used to establish an N or P reduction. In principle, individuals' preferences can be incorporated into the purchase decision in a WQT auction, with a conservation buyer or a buyer's agent or a corporation's manager of sustainability directing the purchase of a particular type of water quality credit. Incorporating individuals' preference could further influence providers, such as farmers, to favor decisions on adoption of BMPs that might offer a price premium for credits produced. Our study demonstrates a valuation process and discusses how an agent (e.g., a conservation buyer) could use knowledge of valuation by constituents or customers to guide purchase decisions in existing WQT markets designed to facilitate only ambient water quality. In our context, the compliance buyers may be motivated in part by environmental ethics, but they are subject to a regulatory requirement. Noncompliance buyers, or the conservation buyers, would be acting in an entirely voluntary manner, motivated, presumably, by a personal concern for improving the environment, or by corporate sustainability or responsibility goals in the case of businesses buying credits voluntarily.
We work in collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute's (EPRI) Ohio River Basin Trading Project platform where we can execute real water quality credit transactions using individual decisions. The EPRI project [Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 2010 , 2014 , 2016 ] is a unique, interstate trading program, with Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky the first states to reach agreement on standards and coordination. In March 2014, EPRI completed transactions on its first interstate credits. Related to our research of valuing the ecosystem service cobenefits, EPRI has been testing approaches for corporations to achieve sustainability goals, creating economic incentives in support of farmers, and conducting ecosystem restorations. In EPRI's projects, participating farmers generate water quality credits by reducing their loadings of total nitrogen (TN) or total phosphorus (TP) below historic practices. Besides quantifying the water quality credits, EPRI documents the presence of many cobenefits provided by the BMPs. The cobenefits are also confirmed by a third party such as a Soil and Water Conservation District and checked against the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) 2012 Conservation Effects chart which rates the conservation effects of the various USDA and NRCS BMP standards. EPRI records ancillary benefits such as carbon sequestration, habitat
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enhancement, and excessive run-off, among others. The Ohio River Basin Trading Project's online credit trading registry provides public information on the implemented water quality improvement projects and associated ancillary benefits. Our experiment designs, especially the choice experiment scenarios described below, are based on a data set composed from the online credit trading registry with the assistance of the EPRI team.
To illustrate the potential to value and to integrate cobenefits into water quality trading transactions, we employed two main steps. First, we conducted a choice experiment that enables us to estimate individual valuation for cobenefits relative to the public-good value for water quality improvement, based on the descriptions of real projects implemented by EPRI. This step draws on the experience of Newell and Swallow [2013] for real money choice experiments. The choice experiment approach falls in the class of stated preference valuation methods from environmental economics [Louviere et al., 2000] . We design three treatments that differ in individual response incentives, so that we can examine the robustness of our preference measures relative to response incentives and consequentiality [Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler et al., 2012] . The first treatment uses a hypothetical referendum where individuals are told their decisions will be used for policy analyses only; while hypothetical, the survey meets the Carson and Groves criteria for consequentiality by offering insight to public agencies addressing environmental quality concerns. The second treatment uses a real referendum where individuals are told their decisions will influence real purchase decisions through our partnership with EPRI, and that the influence will be through aggregated decisions of their group. These two treatments present opportunities for individuals to misrepresent their true preferences in a strategic effort to generate outcomes they prefer without fully accounting for a personal cost. The third treatment uses a random lottery decision rule where we will implement the actual choices (purchase the water quality credit bundle of the exact same quantity of N or P reduction from projects linked to the specific profile of cobenefits) made by a randomly chosen individual. This procedure makes the choices in the third treatment real, not simply stated. Under theoretical conditions, this third treatment is considered incentive-compatible [Vossler et al., 2012] , meaning that the decision rules eliminate incentives for individuals to make choices that misrepresent, or are inconsistent with, their true values. Our estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) suggest individuals are more sensitive to the cost changes and reveal the lowest WTP in the third treatment, using real choices with the incentive compatibility random lottery rule.
In the second step, we estimate a representative utility function that incorporates cobenefits in addition to nutrient reductions affecting Ohio River water quality. We are able to decide the optimal allocation of a fixed budget across credits of different types, which identifies bundles of credits that are most valued by a representative group considering tradeoffs among available profiles of cobenefits. Third, we conduct a counterfactual analysis and estimate the welfare effect of incorporating cobenefits in trading decisions. Conditional on our study population and our specification of a planner's social objective function, our results suggest about 34% welfare improvement after considering cobenefits in credit purchasing decisions. This third step, while illustrative, lays out a framework for using nonmarket valuation results to affect real decisions and efforts to enhance environmental quality.
Our cobenefits valuation is analogous to ecosystem service benefits measured in numerous stated preference and other valuation studies, including projects involving watershed and water quality management applications [e.g., Johnston et al., 1999; Johnston et al., 2002; Kafle et al., 2015] and choice experiments involving cash transactions with students [Spencer et al., 1998 ] and general citizens [Newell and Swallow, 2013] . It is worth noting that Spencer et al. [1998] demonstrate that students show a positive willingness to pay for water quality projects that may occur far from their residence, in both a cash-based and a hypothetical setting. Our valuation experiments are conducted in a similar manner where we use students from the University of Connecticut. Results show that students' willingness to pay is affected not only by the quantity of water quality credits but also by the associated cobenefit profile. Our vision is to demonstrate the plausibility of this approach and use it to identify challenges in future, possible field experiments where we can focus on public preferences of residents in the Ohio River Basin, particularly for residents who may be more active in environmental groups and therefore more likely to be in the market for ecosystem services linked to projects affecting water quality. Yet our results already show that residency in the Ohio River Basin is not essential to an individual having a nonzero value. These results are consistent with the possibility that water quality in a nationally significant river and associated ecosystem-service improvements may deliver public goods (i.e., goods or services that many people can enjoy simultaneously).
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Our approach can be of particular interest to noncompliance, conservation buyers. In principle, we can estimate the willingness to pay for different types of cobenefits based on the coefficient estimates in the utility model following the first step. We then measure value using the concept of willingness to pay (WTP), which measures the monetary sacrifice (i.e., the payment) that an individual would voluntarily make if it were necessary to generate a change from a baseline outcome. The value of a credit to a conservation buyer (i.e., a conservation-minded citizen rather than a polluter subject to regulation) is based on his or her WTP to obtain and set aside the credit rather than not doing so. Setting aside the credit can benefit many such conservation-minded citizens simultaneously, so a purchase of this type would recognize the credit as a public good; the citizen is doing so to improve water quality and environmental cobenefits generally, not because of his or her own need to buy an offset for some personally generated contribution within regulated emissions limits. Our buyers are purchasing a public good and themselves are not motivated by the cap-and-trade regulation, while compliance buyers would be purchasing the ability to operate in compliance with emissions regulations. However, it is possible that corporations and other compliance buyers will engage in voluntary offset markets for analogous reasons, fulfilling their own corporate policies for sustainability or corporate responsibility, possibly in consideration of demands of the consumers of their primary products; EPRI has already included this motivation in the Ohio River Basin trading [EPRI, 2010 [EPRI, , 2014 .
In addition, our approach, when applied using a representative sample drawn from a relevant population or constituency, could be used as a foundation for a government to offer subsidies for BMPs that produce more highly valued portfolios of cobenefits. For example, a compliance buyer could buy water quality credits within existing trading markets or auctions, and government could pay the providers a bonus for credits assigned to the buyer, with the bonus related to the magnitude of value provided by the cobenefits. However, from this basic idea, there may flow a number of research questions that deserve evaluation regarding implementation of such payments for cobenefits, including the possibility that such payments could lead to inefficient over provision of cobenefits or even water quality, as well as the possibility or likelihood that cobenefits would create an economic justification for lowering the relevant cap in a cap and trade market for water quality. Our paper opens the door for future research in this direction.
Experiment Design
Our experiments are built around a choice experiment (CE) framework, as used by environmental economists. CEs present individuals with two or more alternatives described, in this case, by the quantity of N or P reduction a project will create and the list of cobenefits that a BMP project producing the N or P reduction will influence. An example CE question is presented in Figure 1 . Analysis of choices individuals make in such CEs provides information on what attributes the individual is willing to sacrifice in the face of some other attributes available by choosing a different option. Thus, CEs help identify tradeoffs individuals are willing to make, and, often of particular interest, estimating the rate at which individuals are willing to incur monetary cost in return for a change in any particular attribute allows economists to estimate an individual's willingness to pay or economic value for the attribute.
We conducted four experimental sessions at the University of Connecticut (UConn), Storrs Campus. Our data sample consisted of 117 undergraduate, adult students from four different classes. Two classes were administered by the Agricultural and Resource Economics Department with the course titles ''Population, Food and the Environment'' and ''Applied Resource Economics.'' One class was administered by the Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Department with the course title ''Introduction to Conservation Biology;'' the other class was administered by the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, titled ''Special Topics in Environmental Engineering.'' Subjects (student-participants) were notified by their instructors prior to the class that the experiment would be conducted. The attendance rate was comparable to a normal class session and we confirmed with instructors that students who attended the experiment did not differ noticeably compared to a normal class session. We randomly assigned students to a treatment in each class, which effectively eliminates any selection bias that could have arisen across the courses involved, as it was impossible for the students to self-select into their preferred treatment and none of them rejected their designated treatment; participants were aware there were several treatment groups but did not receive information on what the treatments were, other than receiving instructions specific only to their own treatment. All students participated in our experiment, except one student who enrolled in two of the above four classes; thus he or she only participated in the experiment once. None of the students were forced or pressured to participate in the experiment; they were presented with an informational sheet required by IRB (Institutional Review Board) for human subjects that indicated they could choose not to participate, or stop participating in the experiment at any time. Participants were notified that the participation and outcome would have no impact on their grades, which was confirmed by instructors. The experiments were conducted using paper and pencil.
Our data sample contains three treatments that differ in choice consequentiality and incentive properties. In the experiment, all the subjects listened to a PowerPoint introduction providing a baseline of information on water quality effects of N and P, the Ohio River, effects that may reach the Gulf of Mexico, and water quality credit trading. Subjects were then directed to read a treatment page that detailed the specifics of their treatment, covering the consequentiality of choices and terms of payment (if any). Appendix A summarizes the key sentences we used in the treatment page that offered subjects varied decision incentives and consequentiality. They were told to read the page quietly and carefully as it may decide their payoffs. Following these instructions, individuals were asked to consider a series of eight choice scenarios, as exemplified in Figure 1 . The moderator of the experiment emphasized that personal costs would be limited to $50 provided by the research team, but that any money left over from the $50 would be available for an individual to use according to their own priorities for other expenses or donations to other public-minded projects or groups. Such admonition for the use of money received has been shown to mitigate any potential for a house-money effect [Clark, 2002] .
Treatment 1 uses the Hypothetical Referendum (HR) where subjects were told that their choices would be used to provide input to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and could influence future policy and decision making in water quality trading markets. Also, in Treatment 1, each subject was told that they would be entered into a lottery where one subject would receive a $20 cash reward (this lottery was a feasible means to compensate for effort of participation). The other two treatments involved mechanisms for implementation of real purchases of water quality credits.
Treatment 2 uses the Real Referendum without Incentive Compatibility (RR) mechanism, wherein subjects were told that their choice would influence real purchasing decisions based on a statistical model of how the group of participants in their treatment made choices, with purchases executed through our agreement with EPRI on water quality credit transactions. Using aggregated group decisions introduces strategic opportunities for individuals [Carson and Groves, 2007; Carson et al., 2014; Vossler et al., 2012] and undermines the incentive compatible property. The strategy opportunities enable an individual to make a choice that departs from his or her true preferences in an effort to reduce the chance of a less desirable outcome that could otherwise derive from the aggregate preferences (i.e., votes) of the group. Paralleling Treatment 1, each subject in Treatment 2 was also told that they would be entered in a lottery by which one subject would receive a $20 cash reward.
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Treatment 3 uses the Real Choice with Incentive Compatibility (RC_IC) mechanism. We implemented the random-lottery incentive system for individual choice [Holt, 1986; Holt and Laury, 2002; Myagkov and Plott, 1997] , wherein subjects were told that one subject will be chosen and we will implement exactly one (chosen randomly) of his or her eight decisions. For example, we will purchase the same quantity of water quality credits with an identical combination of cobenefits as implied by the chosen decision. The payment method in Treatment 3 is different from Treatments 1 and 2 in order to establish incentive compatibility. Each subject's choices have an equal probability of being chosen and the chosen subject's payoff equals $201 $502$c j À Á , where the $20 is the fixed amount award used similarly as for the participation incentive in Treatments 1 and 2, $c j is the cost of purchasing the water quality credit bundle when a subject chooses option j, and $50 is the amount provided by the researchers so that a deficit for the individual is impossible. For example, if one chooses to buy a water quality bundle that cost her $30 among other alternatives, then the potential financial payoff from this choice is $201 $502$30 ð Þ 5$40; however, if she chose the status quo of buying nothing, the potential financial payoff is $201 $502$0 ð Þ 5$70; in addition to a financial payoff, individuals would receive the credit and cobenefits from implementation of the randomly chosen choice-question. Note that Treatment 3 creates a payment difference compared to Treatment 1 and 2 for the lottery winner. However, such payment difference is necessary for subjects in Treatment 3 to reveal their true preferences; all three treatments carried the same, base $20 potential payoff, while in treatments 1 and 2 the consideration of a $50 expenditure was based on stated willingness to pay while treatment 3 made this $50 maximum expenditure real. The random lottery incentive system is implemented to ensure that each choice has a positive probability of being selected as the binding outcome. The random lottery incentive system has been widely used in the experimental economics literature and is favored due to its invariance to income effect and the ability to collect incentive compatible data within a limited budget [Wakker, 2007] . It supports the proof of concept presented in this paper.
Note that both Treatment 2 and 3 are consequential more or less immediately, since an individual's choices will influence actual purchase decisions, while Treatment 1 is consequential only because the results obtained could influence future policy choices. Also, we note that participants in Treatments 2 and 3 were not explicitly told that their data might influence policy; thus their responses should be focused on the single decision implemented as a direct result of the choice experiment. In Treatment 3, the cost attribute is real and immediate under the random lottery incentive system, while in Treatments 1 and 2 the cost attribute is hypothetical in the immediate term.
Experiment Implementation
One experimental session lasted about 45 min including the introduction and instructions requiring about 15 minutes, 20 minutes for filling out the series of choices, and 10 minutes reserved to collect the survey, draw the lottery winner for Treatments 1 and 2, and draw one binding choice for Treatment 3 for each class. Experimental instructions along with the choice experiments (booklets) were then handed out systematically to students by two experimental assistants. Subjects were instructed not to open the booklet and flip the pages unless told to do so.
After each student received the booklet, the experiment moderator read the introduction section aloud. Students were then directed to read the treatment page quietly before they answering the choice experiment questions. We also attached a short demographic survey at the end of the booklet. Communication among students was strictly prohibited once the experiment began. Students were told to raise their hands if they had any questions and one of the experimental assistants would approach the student and answer questions privately. After collecting all the surveys, student volunteers were asked to pick the lottery winner from the survey piles separated by treatments, and the binding choice question under Treatment 3 was drawn by one participant-volunteer randomly picking from a box of uniquely numbered ping-pong balls. This process was conducted separately at the end of each class session, with all participants able to witness, and the lottery winners were paid cash immediately after the experiment.
A Random Utility Model for Valuing Cobenefits
We analyze our experimental data using a random utility model, which assumes that individuals make choices that identify their most preferred alternative in a question, given the context of the choice, including the incentives created by the manner in which their choices are consequential. This most preferred
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alternative is presumed to maximize the person's happiness or ''utility.'' Currently, EPRI's Ohio River Trading simply tracks the presence or absence of cobenefits associated with BMP projects. Table 1 defines the attributes and variables to be considered in the econometric analysis. Some cobenefits themselves are multidimensional, but existing EPRI-contracted BMP projects did not allow separate delivery of each benefit at the time of the experiment. In particular, BMPs that provided habitat enhancements always affected both wildlife generally and pollinators, while any BMPs providing carbon sequestration also benefited soil health; all BMP profiles presented in any choice question corresponded to real credits available through EPRI.
In theory, CE questions that include two or more alternatives can be used to construct a utility function that quantifies the tradeoffs between cobenefits and monetary costs, thus enabling the recovery of willingness to pay for the cobenefits associated with one unit (pound) of water quality improvement credit. Econometric identification is possible through the researcher's control over creating pairs of choice scenarios at various costs to respondents. For example, in a CE question, subjects may decide to buy one credit for a unit of N loading avoided with a wider variety of cobenefits at a high unit price or decide to buy one credit at a cheaper price, but with fewer cobenefits. Therefore, the implied credit price used in the choice scenarios may not match with the real transactions price, but including cost in the choices is essential to evaluate individual utility at different price points and implement an econometric estimation of the utility function in the relevant price region. In practice, for public goods, the combination of payments from several individuals could be used to cover the price demanded by a credit seller. a We constructed a data set that links each water quality project with its generated credits as well as cobenefits, based on the data available from Ohio River Basin Trading Project's online credit trading registry as of 16 April 2015. We find the cobenefits carbon sequestration and soil health always appear together in the competed projects, which makes the identification of their separate effects impossible. Thus, we combine the carbon sequestration and soil health cobenefits together and create the new variable. Similarly with the habitat enhancement and pollinator habitat cobenefits.
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Consistent with the random utility framework [McFadden, 1973; Hanemann, 1984] , individual i's utility (e.g., satisfaction or happiness) from choosing an option j, U ij , consists of an econometrically measurable, deterministic component, V ij , and a random component, ij , which is unobservable to econometricians and assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid). The measurable component V ij depends on (i) the bundle of a quantity of water quality credits and cobenefits, denoted by vector X j ; (ii) the socioeconomic characteristics of the individual i, denoted by S i ; and (iii) the individual's cost c j of choosing the option j. Note that c i 50 if the option is status quo (e.g., buying zero units of water quality credit). Specifically, individual i's utility from choosing an option j is
The vector X j can be decomposed into the quantity of credits, Q j , and its cobenefits Z j , where Z j is a vector of ones and zeros indicating, respectively, the presence or absence of cobenefits. As the EPRI project expands, some of these cobenefits may be quantified, but the framework here is readily modified to allow for additional details in future applications.
In the choice experiment questions, each subject considers three buying alternatives ( Figure 1 ): buying one of two water quality credit bundles (option A or B) or taking the status quo of buying nothing. If the individual's choice implies his or her utility is higher for alternative j 2 A; B; N f g J, providing utility U ij compared to all the other alternatives U ik (k 6 ¼ j; k 2 J), then the probability that individual i chooses alternative j is estimated by
where Pr Á ð Þ represents the probability operator. Based on the error structure, the probability can be simplified [McFadden, 1973] as:
Given the qualitative cobenefits information (i.e., presence versus absence), we incorporate the cobenefits in utility based on Chicoine [1981] and Shonkwiler and Reynolds [1986] , where the cobenefit value is a function of the quantity of credits. This modeling strategy is more compatible with economic theory compared to treating each cobenefit as a dummy variable that additively enters the utility function. For example, it is reasonable to expect the carbon sequestration benefit generated from producing 10 pounds of N credits is higher than the carbon sequestration benefit generated from producing 1 pound of N credit. While numerous stated-preference studies implement equation (2) as linear in the attributes (elements of X j ), that modeling strategy would unrealistically imply the same carbon sequestration benefit regardless of the quantity of credits (or the impacted areas for adopted BMPs); moreover, it is possible that the complexity of a portfolio of cobenefits could stimulate interactions on the value participants hold for any particular credit and its cobenefits. Therefore, we use a utility specification that differentiates the value of a credit by incorporating the cobenefits nonlinearly in relation to specific project characteristics, following Chicoine [1981] and Shonkwiler and Reynolds [1986] :
where a, the coefficient on cost c j , is expected to be negative to be economically meaningful; higher cost implies lower utility (lower satisfaction). Our results (below) show that a is negative and significant, conforming to economic theory and the cost attribute negatively influences the desirability of a water quality credit bundle.
The D i captures individual-specific effects and is specified as a function of demographic information:
where S m indexes individual demographic attributes, such as age and gender (see Table 1 ). For identification purposes, the term c 0 1 P We will need to estimate the marginal value of a credit in order to illustrate the magnitude of value or relative value that cobenefits add to the value of a credit below. With this model, and to ground the illustrative exercise within the range of data generated by the choice experiments, we consider the valuation of adding a unit at the margin represented by the mean quantity of credits presented in the choice experiment questions. Therefore, we are interested in estimating the marginal utility of buying one more unit at quantity Q j , which is:
where Q j is the average quantity considered by the individual.
When b 0 11 > 0, the marginal utility of buying one more unit is always positive. The second-order derivative is:
which implies that when b 0 2 21; 0 ð Þ, individuals exhibit diminishing marginal utility and when b 0 ! 0 individuals exhibit weakly increasing marginal utility based on a quantity of credits with a given portfolio of cobenefits. We take a log transformation of the above utility function, defining
Thus, r 0 in equation (5) can be interpreted as the alternative specific constant (ASC) and captures the tendency to purchase the credit relative to buying nothing. Our utility model is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method following standard practice for discrete models [Greene, 2003] . The MLE estimator is:ĥ
where the p ijn indicates individual i's probability (likelihood, from equation (3)) of choosing alternative j at question n.
Since the number of attributes available can lead to an extremely large number of possible choices, we used the experimental design software Ngene [ChoiceMetrics, 2014] to identify a smaller set of choices needed to econometrically identify the model above efficiently. The experimental sessions presented participants with eight choice questions. This process generated 16 unique choice scenarios by maximizing D-efficiency, split into 2 blocks and thereby creating 8 choice questions from 1 block. Each participant was presented a single block of choice questions.
Results and Discussion
Our 117 undergraduate student-participants produced 917 individual level choices; 19 individual choices (about 2% of the total sample, from 6 subjects) were incomplete and thus the incomplete choices were dropped from the final model. Among the 117 subjects, 41 were assigned to Treatment 1, 37 were assigned to Treatment 2 and 39 subjects were assigned to Treatment 3 through the randomization process. The booklets were handed out from a stack with treatments 1, 2, and 3 in a repeated sequence from top to bottom, with the sequence starting from a treatment randomly assigned to the top for each class session. Table  1 describes all the variables used in our analysis of individual preferences. The choice experiment variables include the number of units in the credit bundle, the nutrient reduced (Nitrogen or Phosphorous), the individual's private cost of purchasing the credit bundle, and the cobenefits present from the BMP project that produced the credits. We use gender, undergraduate major (economic major versus engineering or natural science major) and year in college for the demographic variables. We also collected other demographic
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information but then dropped these due to concerns for multicollinearity. For example, the age variable is highly correlated with the year-of-school variable. In the model specification, we define the alternative specific constant variable ASC and a dummy variable for each treatment (see Table 1 for definitions). The ASC variable enters the regression model by replacing c 0 in equation (5). The treatment dummy enters the regression model by interacting with the ASC variable and the ln(Cost) variable (e.g., Table 3 ).
In Table 2 , we present the estimation for the eight model specifications. We estimate the coefficients for the pooled data and then separately for each treatment, with and without demographic information. We do not find an apparent pattern on gender, year of school and major on choice decisions. None of the demographic variables are significant at 5% level. Likelihood ratio tests between each model without demographic information and the corresponding model with demographic information suggest that only the difference between Model (5) and Model (6) is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, other coefficients in Model (5) and (6) are very close in magnitude. Overall, we conclude that the demographic information does not substantially alter the model estimates in an economically meaningful way, which is not surprising given our relatively homogenous pool of subjects (i.e., UConn undergraduate adults). This result also mitigates the concern for any interaction effects that might exist between the demographic variables and treatment variables. Nonetheless, a field application in future studies with general citizens could reveal substantial differences among different demographic groups.
Therefore, for the current discussion we focus on the treatment effects and choice experiment related variables. We consider treatment effects first, so that we have a foundation for understanding the robustness of valuation information to treatment effects. With this foundation, we then move to discuss the valuation information and implications for environmental markets. 
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We find that the coefficients on the quantity variable ln(Units) and price variable ln(Cost) have expected signs. The quantity coefficient, b 0 11, is positive, significant, and close to 1. We also find b 0 is not statistically different from zero in either the separate models or the pooled model, which suggests that (conditional on cobenefits) a more or less constant marginal utility of buying one more unit in the relevant price range (Table 3) .
The cost coefficient a is negative, significant, and varies substantially across treatments. We observe that the magnitude of the ln(Cost) coefficient, b 0 11, increases as the treatment becomes more ''consequential'' (from Treatments 1 to 3). The magnitude of the ln(Cost) coefficient is the smallest in the HR, Hypothetical Referendum treatment (Treatment 1), and the largest in the RC_IC, Real Choice with Incentive Compatibility treatment (Treatment 3). Compared to RR, the Real Referendum without Incentive Compatibility treatment (Treatment 2), the RC_IC treatment not only influences the actual purchase outcomes, but also has a positive probability of determining one's final payoff. Therefore, compared to HR, subjects in the two Real Referendum treatments are more sensitive to the cost change with the cost coefficient measuring the largest (negative) effect influencing the utility in the RC_IC treatment.
While the above analysis provides some evidence regarding the influences of different treatments, such comparisons based on separate models are not entirely on a common ground. The scale parameters (which can be different across models involving different treatments) might contribute to the difference in the cost coefficients. We followed Swait and Louviere [1993] to test the difference in treatment effects accounting for the impact of scale parameters using the models specified according to Table 2 without demographic attributes. Our log-likelihood ratio tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated from the HR and RR treatments are equivalent (first step allowing the scale parameter heterogeneity, p50.80; second step constraining the scale parameter to be the same, p50.83). However, we rejected the null hypotheses that the coefficients estimated from the HR and RC_IC, and from the RR and RC_IC treatments, are equivalent at a 5% significance level.
Furthermore, it is unclear to us whether the RC_IC would directly influence the probability of choosing the status quo option, as subjects may just opt to maximize the potential monetary payoff and totally ignore the environmental benefits. This is often called the nonparticipation problem, possibly, in this case, related to a strong free-riding incentive when a mechanism involves a real money payment for a public good [Mitani and Flores, 2014; Newell and Swallow, 2013; Spencer et al., 1998; Von Haefen et al., 2005] . Therefore, we estimate a pooled data model where coefficients and the scale parameter are constrained to be equal across treatments, while allowing the ASC and the cost coefficient a to vary across treatments through their interactions with the treatment-specific dummies. Table 3 presents the results for a constrained, pooled estimation that includes the interaction effects of ASC and the cost coefficient with treatment-specific dummies. We replace the treatment-specific dummies with class-specific dummies in Model (2) and Model (3) in Table 3 . Our results suggest that none of the interaction effects of the class dummies with the ASC and the cost coefficient are significant at a 0.05 significant level.
From Table 3 , we find that the interaction terms ASC*Treatment2 and ASC*Treatment3 are not statistically significant in Model (3), which implies subjects in the RR and RC_IC do not exhibit a higher tendency toward choosing the status quo option. The interaction term ln(Cost)*Treatment2 is insignificant, suggesting that the subjects do not treat the cost attribute significantly differently between the HR and RR treatments that both lack incentive compatibility, at least in this particular model specification. The negative significant coefficient on ln(Cost)*Treatment3 suggests that the subjects in the RC_IC treatment are more sensitive to the cost change compared to HR, which parallels the statistical test results based on Table 2 . Our results suggest that the demonstrated difference between a hypothetical referendum and a real, incentive compatible referendum [List and Gallet, 2001; Murphy et al., 2005; Newell and Swallow, 2013; Spencer et al., 1998; Vossler and Evans, 2009; Vossler et al., 2012] may not originate from a higher tendency to choose the status quo, zero private cost option (usually in a trichotomous format), but rather from differentiated reactions to the cost parameters. Our results suggest that subjects in a real, incentive compatible referendum incur a higher disutility compared to a hypothetical treatment from the same incremental increase in private cost.
From Table 2 , we observe a consistent pattern regarding the influence of cobenefits. Subjects slightly tend to prefer buying nitrogen credits compared to phosphorous credits, but this tendency is not statistically significant. The cobenefit Agricultural Viability is insignificant across all treatments. The cobenefits Habitat Enhancement and Pollinator Habitat, Reduce Excessive Run-off and Reduce Animal Stress and Mortality are positive and significant across all treatments. The cobenefit Carbon Sequestration and Soil Health is positive and significant in the RC_IC treatment and the pooled estimation result, while still positive but insignificant in the HR and RR treatments. The above results suggest that subjects do consider the value of the cobenefits when assessing the tradeoff between different credit bundles.
Background for Valuation and Willingness to Pay Estimates
One of our objectives is to monetize subjects' valuation toward cobenefits using the willingness to pay concept. Our study supports a demonstration of using a valuation approach and linking results to purchase decisions that a conservation-minded buyer could make in real WQ trades. Practitioners wanting to use this approach might use one of the treatment-contexts we present here, including an approach based only on stated preference data from participant choices without the prospect of actual purchase decisions. That practitioner's decision might be driven by their own budget for data gathering, or other factors unique to the organization or constituents such a practitioner (say a conservancy group) might represent. We have shown here that purchase decisions in our three treatments, albeit with our particular participant-group, appear to preferences for tradeoffs among the cobenefits similarly across the treatment-contexts, but there appears a statistically different response to the monetary costs across treatments. Our RC_IC treatment could be adopted as valid in measuring overall valuation; this approach meets theoretical conditions for validity in common discussions of valuation [Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler et al., 2012] . A practitioner could also use the a stated preference approach to supplement data that might be generated through an incentive-compatible choice approach, in a manner analogous to combining stated preference data and revealed preference data in valuation research [e.g., Adamowicz et al., 1994] . Therefore, we may potentially estimate a model that pools the data as Model (3) and (5) in Table 2 but allows for the coefficient on an individual's cost to be calibrated to the RC_IC data. This approach is built on the idea that the relative valuation between the cobenefits is not affected by the treatment-context, while the actual willingness to pay values differ between the RC_IC (treatment 3) and the other treatments that lack incentive compatibility.
We now turn to how to identify WTP from participants in our type of choice experiment, linking their values to purchase decisions of a conservation buyer, and identifying how decisions that overlook cobenefits might lead to a less-valuable set of credit purchases. In demonstrating the linkage to market, we will establish a baseline of credit purchase decisions that would arise if the conservation buyer ignored cobenefits, and then evaluate the willingness to pay-the maximum payment-that a representative individual (in our participant population) would offer in order to obtain an alternative portfolio of water quality credits chosen in consideration of their cobenefits. This maximum willingness to pay is defined as the amount of money that, if an individual paid it in order to obtain credits with cobenefits different from the baseline, would just 
where Z5 Z 1 ; . . . ; Z m . . . f g . We will evaluate WTP using values of the independent variables set to their sample means in order to evaluate how WTP changes with quantity from the core or average of the quantity within the range of our data following the common practice to evaluate WTP for a representative agent. Thus, the willingness to pay for buying one additional water quality credit (WTP q ) evaluated at the sample mean satisfies:
where V is the representative utility function and the Q and c represent the mean of credit quantity and cost of a bundle, respectively. The vector Z 0 5 0; . . . ; 0 . . . ; 0 f g represents no co benefits are associated with the water quality credit. Thus, the WTP estimated for one additional unit of water quality credit (with no cobenefits) is
The variance for the above WTP estimates can be calculated using the delta method where the variance of a nonlinear function of two random variables is recovered by taking a first-order Taylor expansion at the mean value of the independent variables and calculating the variance for the Taylor expansion of equation (12) [Greene, 2003; Hole, 2007] .
Similarly, we can calculate the willingness to pay for a cobenefit associated with water quality credit production. Let Z 5 Z 1 ; . . . ; Z m21; 0; Z m11; . . . ; Z M È É where the mth entry equals 0 and the remaining values are evaluated at the sample mean, and Z m 5 Z 1 ; . . . ; Z m21; 1; Z m11; . . . ; Z M È É where mth entry equals 1 and the remaining values are evaluated at the sample mean. The willingness to pay (WTP m ) for adding cobenefit m to the average quality credits satisfies,
Thus,
For the purposes of this discussion, we wish to illustrate the relative magnitude of value for the cobenefits in Figure 2 . Our functional form is nonlinear, so that these values would depend upon the quantity of credits as well as the order of consideration. Therefore, to abstract from this ordering effect, we use equations (11) and (12) to obtain the baseline value of a credit for a P-reduction) (see the bottom segment of bars in Figure 2 ; as shown, N-credits add a statistically insignificant addition of $0.03-$0.06). Then, we use equations (13) and (14) to estimate the value of adding a cobenefit to the average number of credits when the indicator dummy variables of all other cobenefits are at their sample means (see remaining segments of bars in Figure 2) . Thus, Figure 2 shows the recovered WTP results for one additional credit with no cobenefits and a representative increment in WTP from each cobenefit Table 4 provides the corresponding 95% confidence interval following the estimated WTP for cobenefits and the water quality credit in Figure 2 .
As implied by the regression results, the estimated value for one unit of water quality credit with all cobenefits is smallest in RC_IC treatment ($2.32) and highest in the HR treatment ($5.12). The estimated willingness to pay for one unit of water quality credit without any cobenefits ranges from $1.28 (45.5% of the total value) in RC_IC treatment to $2.61 (49.6% of the total value) in the HR treatment. The willingness to pay estimates from the RC_IC treatment is considered to be the closest to individuals' true average willingness to pay as, in principle, it does not suffer from hypothetical bias or strategic manipulation incentives because RC_IC satisfies incentive-compatibility criteria that economists generally seek for a valid measure of value [Carson and Groves, 2007] .
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Our results suggest the presence of cobenefits can significantly increase individuals' WTP for a water quality credit. Particularly, the combined added-value for cobenefits is only slightly less than the value for the water quality credit alone (without the cobenefits), while the value for specific cobenefits varies substantially. Our results show that the WTP estimates for the cobenefit carbon sequestration and social health and the cobenefit reduce animal stress and mortality are the highest, while the increment to WTP for the cobenefit agricultural viability is the lowest. However, the WTP estimates for cobenefit carbon sequestration and social health and cobenefit reduce animal stress and mortality are not statistically different from other types of cobenefits. These results are consistent across different treatments, though the absolute magnitude of WTP differs.
Incorporating Cobenefit Values into Purchase Decisions
In this section, we construct a framework for using nonmarket valuation results to perform actual purchase decisions that account for cobenefits in water quality credit trading. In our experiment, the treatment HR does not require us to perform any real transactions; the treatment RC_IC requires us to purchase credits Figure 2 . Decomposition of willingness to pay for water quality credit and cobenefits ($/unit). Confidence interval are estimated using the delta method. c Cobenefits row shows the sum of cobenefits (excluding the Nitrogen value). The water quality credit and cobenefits row show both the total value of cobenefits and the water quality credit using Phosphorus credit as the baseline (excluding the Nitrogen value). The proportion of cobenefits is the sum of cobenefits divided by the total value of the water quality credit and the sum of cobenefits.
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according to the binding individual choice. In reality, the individual private cost of purchasing a credit does not have to be equal to the actual price received by the credit seller. Since water quality improvement and cobenefits are public goods, a credit transaction is feasible as long as the aggregation of individual payments (through the individual-cost variable) is higher than the reservation price of the credit seller. Therefore, for purposes of the experiment and value measurement, we executed the credit transactions with EPRI according to the chosen options implied by the randomized lottery outcome (Treatment 3, RC_IC) and subsidize any remaining deficits, as EPRI usually charges a prespecified price (recently $10 minimum) for water quality credits that is higher than an individual's willingness to pay per unit (in our data, around $2.50 as in Figure 2) . Alternatively, our results suggest the value of approximately four experiment-participants would have been enough to cover EPRI's $10 delivery cost. The estimated result from RC_IC treatment is only used to provide a benchmark for valuation comparison and is not used for other purchase or policy decisions, since doing so would violate incentive compatibility in theory [Vossler et al., 2012] and undermine the data generation process in the future.
Below we work through the purchase decision process on the assumption that a conservation-minded buyer would use the data from the RR treatment (using estimated parameters from Model 5, Table 2 ) because this treatment involved participants in a consequential, group aggregated decision process for ''optimally'' purchasing credits with different cobenefit profiles. Our purpose is to demonstrate an economic framework by which a conservation buyer, facing a budget constraint, could enhance social benefits by considering various cobenefits when making credit purchase decisions.
Assume that there are K types of water quality credits available. Each type of water quality credit differs in the cobenefit profile Z k and potentially has a unique price p k . The conservation-buyer's (or social planner's) problem is to maximize the public value from purchasing different types of credits while accounting for the public value (i.e., the buyer's constituents' value) for cobenefits given a fixed budget C. One way of specifying the social objective function, V s , is to aggregate credits across different types for a representative individual with an aggregate cost for the bundle. In this case, the social planner would maximize
where C is the available budget and Z k 5 Z k;1 ; . . . ; Z k;m ; . . . ; Z k;z À Á . The subscript k represents the type-k credit with its cobenefits profile Z k . However, since (Table 2) , the social welfare function V s1 exhibits increasing marginal value for one unit of credit. Under this objective function, the social planner would spend the entire budget purchasing the type of credit with the most-valued set of cobenefits, ending up in a corner solution, because for the prices we currently face with EPRI are not differentiated by credit-type (p k 5P; 8kÞ. (If price varied with type-k, the planner's maximum might occur off of the corner with the most-preferred set of cobenefits, but possibly at a different corner solution.) However, we believe that approach, while having merit on theoretical grounds, fails to recognized that our functional form is partially an artifact of current institutional constraints by which EPRI's existing credits do not explicitly quantify cobenefits beyond presence-absence. To apply that approach, we believe, would impose an artificial constraint on our illustration of a process by which a real conservation buyer might make decisions. A real planner or conservation buyer would likely recognize that credits providing different cobenefits may actually deliver different quantitative increments of benefit within different bundles. We therefore choose, as a primary example below, a form of the welfare function that exploits the planner's budget constraint to recognize the potential for substitutability between credits bearing different portfolios of cobenefits. This approach will assume a representative individual's utility function would be additively separable in contributions to utility from purchasing credits of a particular type; his or her utility would be the sum of utilities across bundles estimated from equation (10). While any choice is subject to approximation errors in estimation, we believe our treatment best recognizes the potential that a planner's constituents would expect a diverse portfolio of credits. Our general intent here is to provide an illustration of the process by which a conservation buyer might proceed, noting that future opportunities through the EPRI project or other real markets may support alternative specifications built on future, quantitative measures of cobenefits.
We therefore specify a social planner's objective function V s2 as follows, assuming the objective function is a linear aggregation of utilities obtained across different types of credits:
We also assume the available budget is insufficient to exhaust the supply for any credit type in the market. The optimized allocation outcome can be denoted as
Given the budget constraint faced by the social planner, we rewrite the objective function above by substituting the cost variable C k with p k Q k :
We next set up the Lagrangian and derive the first order conditions where the marginal benefit for each type of credit, k, is balanced at the margin to maximize the objective function. From the first order conditions above, we can find the budget ratio spent on any two types of credit is
For K types of water quality credits, equation (17) will generate K-1 independent equations, together with the budget constraint equation P k C k 5C, the amount to spend on each type of water quality credit is uniquely identified. The second-order condition
8k, which leads us to an interior solution where the utility per dollar spent for one unit of credit is equalized at the margin. When the cobenefits are ignored by the conservation buyer, the decision problem becomes:
Denote the solution to the constrained optimization problem in equation (18) as
The welfare gain from incorporating the cobenefits can be expressed in monetary equivalent terms, WG5 P k WG k , satisfying the optimal budget ratio according to equation (17) and:
The magnitude of the term WG represents the amount of additional social benefits realized from considering cobenefits as in equation (16) under the budget constraint according to our objective function rather than in making purchases according to an equal allocation of budget across available projects.
The above analyses show two different functional forms for the objective function and we could either end up in a corner solution (V s1 ) or an interior solution (V s2 ), which implies the ''optimal'' allocation outcome is sensitive to the functional form, i.e., the objective (e.g., a welfare function) the social planner decides to maximize. The corner solution reflects current limitations in the water quality market when the values of cobenefits are to be monetized based only on qualitative presence-absence. Even though our second specification (V s2 ) is intended to mitigate such limitations, we want to caution our readers that the results can vary if we could obtain quantitative cobenefit information or the unit price is different across credit types. Due to such limitations, we leave further discussions to future research. Below we illustrate an example implementation for a conservation buyer, mainly based on the objective function V s2 with the interior solution.
An Example Implementation
According to our preagreement with EPRI, we are able to purchase credits (regardless of types of credits) at a flat $10/unit since the current water quality credit trading market still leaves out the cobenefits and mostly supplies credits at this constant price level. Note that the $10/unit flat price should be viewed as a limitation
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in the business-as-usual practice but nonetheless we use it as a baseline here to quantify potential improvement when cobenefits could be incorporated in the decision makings. We identified six types (K56) of water quality credits associated with different cobenefit profiles. We do not distinguish nitrogen credit from phosphorous credit since our estimation results show that nitrogen credit is not valued at an economically meaningful or statistically significantly different level from a phosphorous credit across all model specifications. To distinguish credits for these two nutrients, one needs 12 different types of credits for the budget allocation problem. Table 5 indicates the unique types of water quality credit associated with different cobenefits that are available from the Ohio River Basin Trading Project's credit registry as of 16 April 2015. According to the objective function V s1 , we purchased $1000 Type 6 credits at a $10/unit price (with the most valued cobenefit profile) due to the corner solution. According to the objective function V s2 , we optimally allocate the $1000 based on the estimation results from Table 2 , Model (5), and account for the cobenefits' value. Below we focus discussions on the implications of using function V s2 . Specifically, we derive the solution to the system of equations built from the budget constraint and equation (16): Our results suggest that, according to the objective function V s2 , most of the budget should be spent on type 2 and type 6 water quality credits (Table  5) . These results are consistent with the fact that type 2 and type 6 credits have the most diversified and valued cobenefits (Table 5) . We observe the near-corner solutions for some other types of credits, especially type 1 and type 5. This result is partially due to the same unit-price being charged for different types of credit. In the long run, water quality credits that lead to more cobenefits would be priced higher and the differentiated pricing scheme could significantly influence the budget allocation calculation. For implementation purposes and recognizing the status quo of the EPRI credit trading market, we find the optimal purchasing decision using the aggregated group decision model is to purchase about $320 of type 2 credit, $494 of type 6, $100 of type 3, $66 of type 4, $16 of type 6 and $3 of type 1 credit at a $10/unit price. In practice, the supply constraint should not be binding if we only purchase a small fraction of total water quality credits available. However, a binding supply constraint would require us to reallocate the remaining budget according the spending ratio for different types. According to equation (19), we can calculate a monetary equivalent welfare gain and estimate a $338.08 equivalent welfare gain after we buy credits that maximize the utility generated for our hypothetical conservation-buyers' clients. This outcome indicates that if a conservation buyer could raise $1000 to obtain a cobenefit-blind set of N and P abatement credits, by instead changing the portfolio purchased in order to optimize cobenefits, the buyer could have raised about $1338. If the conservation buyer has a different budget, e.g., $10,000, based on our model specifications, especially according to equation (16), the spending ratio on two types of credit is not a function of the total budget. Therefore, when the budget changes, the spending ratio is kept the same for any two types of credit.
Since the welfare gain estimate involves many coefficients, using the Delta method with Taylor expansions can be analytically difficult to produce confidence intervals for estimates involving more than two coefficients. Thus, we use the Krinsky-Robb method Robb, 1986, 1990 ] that uses the estimated coefficients and the covariance matrix for the coefficients (see Appendix B), which produces confidence intervals estimated by a bootstrapping procedure. Our bootstrap results show the welfare gain has a 95% confidence interval from $108.06 to $1579.8. Even though the confidence interval is relatively large (limited by the sample size in our experiment), the lower bound of the confidence interval is still an economically meaningful number and implies a substantial welfare improvement if the conservation-buyer incorporates cobenefits in the water quality credit trading market. We acknowledge that it is costly to measure and quantify the presence or the level of the cobenefits in the field, but the cost is more likely to be a fixed cost that can be recovered over years and we expect the cost to be small relative to the potential social benefits of considering cobenefits.
(For space considerations, we do not repeat the example implementation here if a planner chose the V S1 function, but we note that the outcome would have produced a welfare gain of 200% or about $2000 using the optimal corner solution rather than the cobenefit-blind allocation of $1000.)
Conclusion
Completely leaving out and ignoring the cobenefits in WQT markets potentially leads to inefficient market outcomes because the focus on water quality production fails to generate incentives to choose among BMPs that may result in higher environmental quality relative to non-WQ features. There may be an opportunity to correct, at least partially, other externalities through the WQT markets by identifying and leveraging additional aspects that the public values. In this paper, we recognize this gap and initiate a potential, though likely partial, solution to incorporate cobenefits in the water quality credit transactions. Combining experimental data and a structural analysis based on microeconomics theory, we are able to estimate a monetary value for different types of cobenefits. Furthermore, we find that incorporating the cobenefit value in purchase decisions could improve social welfare. In other words, the failure to recognize and value the ancillary or cobenefits leaves both credit suppliers and the public worse off than they could have been. This observation does not imply that WQT somehow creates a new source of loss; that is not the case. Our statement here sets aside complications that may arise in what economists call the second best [Davis and Whinston, 1965] , but these complications can be ubiquitous for any policy to correct externalities for any aspect of the economy and are not unique to WQT. Rather, it represents an opportunity to leverage WQT for further, as yet unrealized improvements in environmental qualities that the public values.
Methodologically, we test three different methods to estimate individuals' willingness to pay. The WTP estimates imply, based on our experimental data, individuals express the lowest WTP in the Real Choice with Incentive Compatibility treatment. This result cautions analysts regarding the potential for misestimating WTP from hypothetical surveys. However, while we leave the details beyond the scope of this paper, results in Figure 2 and our statistical tests for differences in the preference functions suggest that the tradeoffs expressed in our sample are stable in relative terms across the incentives presented in the treatments. This observation carries an important implication for practitioners: the addition to value provided by the cobenefits remains in proportion across the treatments. This outcome implies that if a conservation buyer is able to raise, say, $1000 to buy a set of credits without distinguishing units by cobenefits, such a buyer would be able to obtain a portfolio of credits generating around 34% higher value if selection of the credits optimized the profile of cobenefits based on the social planner's objective function with the interior solution. That is, selecting credits sourced from BMPs with a preferred profile of cobenefits raises the potential for the conservation buyer to attract 34% more funds from constituents, customers, or members. The practitioner could deploy an incentive compatible choice experiment to generate data that enables calibration of WTP estimates [cf. Adamowicz et al., 1994; Murphy et al., 2005] if the practitioner so desires.
Current water quality trading markets heavily rely on regulated entities to purchase water quality credits, as this focus is a critical pathway to improving valuable environmental quality within real economies. Future research can explore the possibility of asking affected private residents and environmental groups who directly value water quality improvement to participate in the WQT market and potentially enlarge the market size with more frequent transactions. Swallow [2013] [cf. Swallow et al., 2008] offers preliminary insights on applying experimental methods to enhance private support for such public goods in a more market-like, rather than philanthropic, setting. Even though our approach relies on a third party who has a budget to spend to improve water quality, we view it as a complementary way, and a potentially more efficient way, to develop environmental markets beyond current value-creation by regulated industries, government subsidies, and charitable spending. These outcomes may arise because, in our approach, public preferences are directly accounted and could reward providers, such as farmers, based in part on the types and quantity of environmental benefits provided beyond water quality. The openness of water quality trading rules to noncompliance or conservation buyers, such as allowed in EPRI's framework, is a critical foundation for leveraging the potential values outside regulatory-driven motives, and, as EPRI recognizes, this could involve the leveraging potential arising through corporate stewardship and sustainability programs, not simply charitable individuals.
Appendix A: Key Sentences on the Treatment Page
In Treatment 1 using the Hypothetical Referendum, subjects were told that:
''Your decisions in this survey will be used to provide input to the U.S. Department of Agriculture to influence future policy and decision making in Water Quality Trading markets. This could influence the future conduct of real markets like EPRI's Ohio River Water Quality Trading program.''
In Treatment 2 using the Real Referendum but lacks Incentive Compatibility, subjects were told that:
''. . .We will make purchasing decisions-and spend real money to buy real water quality credits -based a statistical model of how your group made choices in this survey.''
In Treatment 3 using the Real Choice with Incentive Compatibility, subjects were told that:
''. . .We will randomly choose one person in your group (maybe you) and execute their purchasing decision-spending real money on real water quality credits-based on a randomly drawn question from their survey.''
Appendix B: Using the Krinsky Robb Method to Estimate the Confidence Interval
In this appendix, we describe the procedure to estimate the confidence interval for the budget allocation estimates (Table 5 ) and the welfare change effects. The Krinsky-Robb method is based on taking a large number of draws assuming the coefficients follow a multivariate normal distribution with the coefficient estimates as the mean with the covariance implied by the estimated covariance matrix. We use the coefficients and covariance matrix estimated from Model (5) in Table 2 for confidence interval calculation.
Step 1: Find the estimated coefficient mean and the covariance matrix.
The estimated mean is implied by Model (5), Table 2 . The calculated covariance matrix using the same econometric model and the mean are summarized in Table B1 . Denote the mean vector as b and the covariance matrix as X. Step 2: Generate new coefficient estimates (a new vector b boot ) chosen from a multivariate normal distribution with mean b and the covariance matrix X. According to equation (15) Step 3: Calculate a new welfare gain according to the following equation (18).
Step 4: Repeat Step 2 and Step 3 a large number of times. In our case, we bootstrap (randomly redraw the sample generated by the covariance matrix X) 10,000 times. Thus, we have 10,000 simulated values of C * boot and WG boot . The lower and upper limits of 95% confidence intervals are found by sorting the values (separately for each variable) from low to high and using the 250 th value as the lower limit and the 750 th value as the upper limit. Table B2 provides more detailed information regarding the bootstrap results for C * boot and WG boot . 
